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21. Introduction
Tax payers’ behavior still creates a puzzle for economists. The situation is aptly described
in the introduction of a widely cited paper, titled ”Why Do People Pay Taxes?”:
”In recent years economists have devoted increasing attention to the study
of individual tax evasion. Despite these eﬀorts, however, our understanding
of the reasons behind individual tax compliance behavior remains limited. In
fact, the puzzle of tax compliance is that most people continue to pay their
taxes.”1
According to the rational choice model in the tradition of Becker (1968), risk-neutral
tax payers would be expected to evade taxes on a higher scale than empirically observ-
able: ”A purely economic analysis of the evasion gamble implies that most individuals
would evade if they are ’rational’, because it is unlikely that cheaters will be caught
and penalized.”2. According to Alm/Mc Clelland/Schulz, slightly more than one
percent of tax returns lead to an audit, and the punishment for deceitful evasion is only
75 percent of the tax evaded.
Furthermore, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that changes in the probabil-
ity of detection or the level of punishment do not have the impact on tax payers’
behavior as the rational choice theory predicts3. Rising penalties or higher detection
probabilities do not signiﬁcantly reduce tax evasion. Taking these observations into ac-
count, the theory of strictly rational decision-making seems to be unable to explain
the tax payers’ actual behavior. Referring to empirical results, Baldry (1987, 376)
for instance concludes: ”...these results suggest that it is perhaps the theory which
needs revision.”4 Graetz/Wilde (1985, 357) even claim that ”most of the theoretical
work to date is not particularly useful either for policy analysis nor empirical study.”
Alm/Sanchez/deJuan (1995, 15) add that the traditional approach is a ”reasonable
starting point, but not a good ending point”.
In order to ﬁnd a solution to this puzzle, some authors proposed to introduce the notion
of tax morale. Vast amounts of econometric studies try to suggest a negative correla-
tion between tax morale and tax evasion5. Disutility caused by shame or the feeling
1Alm/Mc Clelland/Schulz (1992, 21); see also Alm/Sanchez/deJuan (1995, 1). It is not our
purpose to argue whether this Tax Payer Puzzle actually exists, we take it as given.
2See Alm/Mc Clelland/Schulz (1992, 21); compare Graetz/Wilde (1985) or Skin-
ner/Slemrod (1985)
3See Pommerehne/Frey (1993, 6) and Roth/Scholz/Witte (1989).
4Similar Alm/McClelland/Schulz (1989, 19): ”It is apparent that a new theory of compliance is
needed, one that can deal with those factors that are either ignored or dealt with unsatisfactorily by
expected utility theory. Such a theory must incorporate the major elements that enter individual’s
compliance decision: the fear of detection and punishment, the overweighting of low probabilities,
and the recognition of government services. It should also recognize another element that is widely
believed to aﬀect compliance: social norms.”
5See Pommerehne/Frey (1993) and Pommerehne/Hart/Frey (1996). Rubinfeld/Frey
(1995) analyze the policy implications of tax morale.
3of guilt increases the opportunity costs of tax evasion. It is not only a feeling of duty
to obey the law that is said to encourage tax payers, but also the insight that taxes
are necessary to ﬁnance public services6. Laboratory experiments were done to support
these hypotheses7. This branch of the literature associates obeying tax morale with a
loss in money income or wealth. An individual accepts such a loss either because she
is programmed to obey the law, or she attempts to avoid disutilities concerned with
tax evasion. To maximize a utility function that depends on income as well as morale
means nothing but to calculate another optimum instead of the one that is derived from
a utility function that only depends on income8. The modiﬁed optimization problem
then takes into account the marginal rate of substitution between morale and income.
However, introducing tax morale by manipulating the utility function such that it ﬁts
with the observation is quite unsatisfactory from the methodological point of view. In
accordance with Becker/Stigler (1977, 89) such an approach should be refuted,
since it gives ”the appearance of considerate judgement, yet really have only been ad
hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures.” Becker/Stigler object to attempts
to explain changes in behavior by changes in utility functions. Another attempt to ex-
plain the puzzle within the framework of perfect rationality would be to introduce the
assumption that tax payers are risk averse. Tax morale as well as risk aversion lead
to modiﬁcations of the maximization problem - either by introducing new explanatory
variables to the utility function or by changing its properties.
A more fruitful appproach would be to assume additional constraints, such as exogenous
rules, that have not been considered by the classical models. The introduction of rules yet
requires an explanation why decision-makers obey rather than simply break them. Other
constraints that might be relevant for the analysis of the puzzle might be based on the
complexity of the tax payer’s decision situation. E. g., Slemrod (1989, 178) points out
that much research on the extent of noncompliance exists, but only recently research has
been focused on the relationship between complexity, compliance costs, and tax evasion.
Some authors recently made use of bounded rationality approaches, e.g. by drawing on
psychological insights, in particular the anomalies and paradoxa which have frequently
been shown in laboratory experiments. Alm/Mc Clelland/Schulz (1989), (1992),
for instance, employ the well tested hypothesis that people systematically overestimate
small probabilities9. Consequently, the predicted tax evasion is below the optimum.
Our paper also models tax payers as boundedly rational, yet it follows an entirely diﬀer-
ent approach, which is based on Heiner’s theory of imperfect decision-making10. It is
assumed that the relative value of two available options depends on which state of nature
occurs. The decision-maker receives some signal about the true state. Interpreting this
signal means to form an internal message. Having formed an internal message he carries
out one of the available actions. In creating this message, an imperfect decision-maker
6See Pommerehne/Weck-Hanneman (1992) or Pommerehne/Hart/Frey (1996) on the inﬂu-
ence of political participation on tax compliance
7See Brandst¨ atter (1994, 213).
8As Schmidtchen (1994, 194, No. 4) points out.
9See Kahneman/Tverski (1979).
10See Heiner (1983), (1985), (1990).
4is likely to commit errors. This is the reason why this theory has been labelled as it
imperfect decision-making.
In this context, the decision between actions can equivalently be described as a decision
between reaction strategies, i.e. plans how to react on the internal messages. These
reaction strategies might be contingent on the internal message11 or non-contingent12. To
choose an non-contingent reaction strategy leads to rule-governed behavior: The decision-
maker then follows a rule of thumb rather than analyzes his environment; by excluding
one of the available options from further consideration, he chooses to systematically
disregard information, even if it is provided by the nature for free13.
Obviously, the concept of imperfect decision-making is closely related to Simon’s prin-
ciple of bounded rationality:
”The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex prob-
lems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is
required for objectively rational behavior in the real world...”14
Simon assumes that human behavior is intendedly rational, but limited in attention and
computational capability15. The boundedly rational decision-maker can be seen as an
agent who tries to perform expected-utility calculations and to update in a Bayesian
way, but is constrained by his limited abilities.
We show that the decision to follow a rule is an expected-utility maximizing choice if
a decision-maker faces a competence-diﬃculty gap (”C-D-gap”). A C-D-gap arises if
the individual competence to analyze a decision problem is below a tolerance limit which
depends on the diﬃculty of the situation. His competence then turns out to be insuﬃcient
to cope with the complexity he faces. In contrast to the traditional approach, which
models tax evasion decision as a simple lottery, we presume that tax evasion is a highly
complex decision problem that confronts decision-makers with Knightian uncertainty, i.e.
the inability to fully comprehend the state space without making mistakes. According
to our model, a C-D-gap will keep a tax payer of limited competence from carrying out
the optimal evasion rate. Hence, our model provides an explanation for the tax payer
puzzle. On the other hand, our model predicts that tax payers of perfect detection skill
would always choose a contingent reaction strategy and carry out the optimal evasion
rate.
According to Simon, bounded rationality provides room for a genuine theory of orga-
nization. We follow his insights in the attempt to show that bounded rationality also
provides room for a genuine economic theory of rule-governed behavior. Furthermore,
the new approach to the tax payer puzzle we present in this paper allows for a surprising
11Such as ”if I observe message one, I carry out option a; having observed message two, I choose option
b”.




5interpretation: Increasing the complexity of the tax law system might lead to higher
compliance by tax payers, even though this sounds counterintuitive at ﬁrst glance.
The second section outlines a theory of imperfect decision making and rule-governed
behavior. In the third section, we apply the results of this theory to the situation of a
tax payer who has to decide whether to increase his tax evasion rate or to stick to the
rate he is used to. The fourth section summarizes and brieﬂy discusses the results.
2. A Theory of Imperfect Decision Making
2.1 The setup of the theory
The theory we present in this section relates imperfect decision-making to rule-governed
behavior. 16 Consider an option set A = {c;d}. The payoﬀs for the decision-maker
depend on the true state of the world, which is unknown to him. The set of possible
states is denoted as S, which is partitioned into disjoint, non-empty subsets Sl and Sg.
A state from the subset Sl occurs with probability 1 − π, hence π is the probability of
Sg. The decision-maker is assumed to maximize the expected monetary payoﬀ.
The payoﬀs related to combinations of actions and true states of the world are deﬁned
such that the option c always brings 0, whereas d brings either a gain g > 0 (in case of
Sg), or a loss l < 0 (in case of Sl)17. The payoﬀ function is visualized in table 1.
Table 1: Imperfect decision-making
True state in Sg Sl
prob. distribution π 1 − π
Actual choice is d g > 0 l < 0
Actual choice is c 0 0
We assume that option c is the customary behavior, the option the decision-maker is
used to carry out. To deviate from this custom by choosing d would provide a higher
degree of uncertainty to him. Hence, the payoﬀ distribution of option d has greater
variance than the one of c.
Now we assume that nature sends a signal whether the true state is Sg or Sl. This
signal is perfectly correlated with the true state, yet the decision-maker knows that he
16The presentation in this section follows the ideas of Heiner (1983), (1985), (1986, 99f.) and
Heiner/Schmidtchen (1995). Green/Swets (1966) and Swets (1988) provide good intro-
ductions into the ”Signal Detection Theory” Heiner refers to.
17The following proposition could also be derived under the assumtion that the payoﬀs from option c
depend on the true state, as shown in Heiner (1986, 99 f.).
6is only imperfectly able to interpret it18 To interpret an external signal means to create
an internal message. With ˆ Si, we denote the internal message that the true state is
Si,i ∈ A. An imperfect decision-maker is likely to interpret the signal wrongly, e.g. his
interpretation of the signal Sl might lead to the internal message ˆ Sg instead of ˆ Sl. We
deﬁne the probability of rightly forming the message ˆ Sg as
r = prob{ ˆ Sg|Sg} (1)
and the probability of wrongly doing so as
w = prob{ ˆ Sg|Sl} (2)
When creating the internal message, two errors are possible. The decision-maker expects
himself to commit these errors either with probability w or with 1−r. Thus, the param-
eters r and w provide a measure for the tax payer’s ability to analyze his environment.
We call this ability detection skill19:
• If (r − w) = 1, then the decison-maker’s detection skill is called perfect
• (r − w) ∈]0,1[ holds for an decision maker of imperfect detection skill
• the case of (r − w) = 0 we call zero detection skill
The parameters π,r and w can be derived from experiments, even if the decision-makers
themselves are not fully aware of them20. Imperfect decision-making can be described
as a deviation of the subjective from the objective partition of the state set S, as it is
shown in ﬁgure 1.
The box symbolizes the state set S, with the dashed line indicating the objective partition
{Sl;Sg}. The decision maker’s subjective partition {ˆ Sl; ˆ Sg}, denoted by the strong line,
deviates from the objective one if the decision-maker is imperfect. The entries in the
four subsets of S show the joint probabilities of the four possible combinations of states
and internal messages.
2.2 Intended but limited rationality
The following ﬁgure 2 summarizes the imperfect decision-maker’s situation. First, na-
ture N chooses its true state and sends a perfectly correlated signal. This is indicated
18To assume imperfectly correlated signals the decision maker interprets perfectly would lead to a quite
similar model. However, there is an important diﬀerence between this approach and the one we have
chosen: Our theory allows to compare the performance of agents that receive the same signals, yet
diﬀer in their imperfection.
19Heiner (1983), (1986) also speaks of reliability.
20Heiner (1986, 67).






(1 − w)(1 − π)
(1 − r)π
S
by the upper left box in ﬁgure 2. The decision-maker E interprets the signal by creat-
ing an internal message. He commits an error with probability 1 − r or w respectively.
Having observed an internal message, E ﬁnds himself in one out of two informations sets
(indicated by the dashed lines in ﬁgure 2) and forms posterior probabilities concerning
the true state. At each of his decision nodes, the decision-maker can choose between the
actions d and c.
Even if the decision-maker’s detection skill is only imperfect, he is assumed to intend
acting rationally. Thus, having observed an internal message, he updates his beliefs
according to the Bayes rule21. We deﬁne the posterior beliefs as µ = prob{Sg| ˆ Sg} and
ν = prob{Sl|ˆ Sl}. Substituting r,w,π into the Bayes formula then leads to the following
expressions for µ and ν:
rπ
rπ + w(1 − π)
= µ (3)
(1 − w)(1 − π)
(1 − w)(1 − π) + (1 − r)π
= ν (4)
(1−µ),(1−ν) can be derived from these equations respectively. Deﬁning T := −l(1 − π)
gπ ,
21See, e.g., Hirschleifer/Riley (1992, 175)
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l < 0 0 g > 0 0
?
we come to the central proposition of the theory of imperfect decision-making22:
Proposition 2.1: Given values of r,w and T, the decision-maker prefers
option d over c if, and only if
• he observes the internal message ˆ Sg and r
w > T holds, or
• he observes the internal message ˆ Sl and 1 − r
1 − w > T holds.
Proof: In both of the cases, the expected payoﬀ from choosing c is zero. We
ﬁrst show that d is preferred to c if ˆ Sg and r
w > T. Having observed ˆ Sg,
the posterior beliefs of the decision-maker are (µ,1 − µ). In this case, the
expected payoﬀ from d is µg+(1−µ)l. Substituting the expression (3) for µ,
this is greater than zero if, and only if rπg+w(1−π)l > 0. This is equivalent
to r/w > T, q.e.d.
If the internal message is ˆ Sl, the updated beliefs are (ν,1−ν). The expected
payoﬀ from d is positive if, and only if, (1−ν)g +νl > 0 which is equivalent
to (1 − r)πg + (1 − w)(1 − π)l > 0, q.e.d.
22See Heiner (1983) and Schmidtchen/Neunzig (1997).
92.3 Reaction strategies
A reaction strategy is a combination of actions (jk) with j,k ∈ A, where j is the plan how
to react on the internal message ˆ Sg and k how to react on ˆ Sl. The above decision-tree
contains four reaction strategies: (dd), (cc), (dc) and (cd). The ﬁrst two ones we call
non-contingent, the latter ones are contingent reaction strategies. With these deﬁnitions,
table 2 states a corollary to the proposition 2.1.
Table 2: Tolerance limit and optimal reaction strategies
T > 1 T = 1 T < 1 optimal strategy
r > wT r > w r > 1 − (1 − w)T (dc)
wT > r > 1 − (1 − w)T r = w ∅ (cc)
∅ r = w wT > r > 1 − (1 − w)T (dd)
r < 1 − (1 − w)T r < w r < wT (cd)
The ﬁrst row of table 1 distinguishes three cases with respect to the value of T. If, e.g.,
the absolute expected loss from choosing d exceeds the expected gain, then T > 1. The
entries in the columns state the conditions under which the reaction strategy indicated in
the last cell of each row would be the expected payoﬀ maximizing choice for the imperfect
decision-maker. This relation between detection skill, denoted by the parameters r and
w, and the tolerance limit T is visualized in the following ﬁgure 3. The main diagonale
in the medium box covers the case of r = w and T = 1, where the decision maker is
indiﬀerent between his non-contingent strategies (dd) and (cc).
Figure 3: Detection skill and optimal reaction strategies









T < 1 T = 1 T > 1
According the theory of imperfect decision making, the ratio r/w is a measure of
a decision-maker’s detection skill or competence, and T is a tolerance limit for this
competence23. With these deﬁnitions, we can state another result.
23Heiner (1983)
10Proposition 2.2: An imperfect decision-maker of positive detection skill al-
ways chooses the contingent reaction strategy (dc), if his competence exceeds
the tolerance limit.
Proof: For the cases of T = 1 and T > 1, the proposition can immediately
be derived from table 2. If T < 1, then (dc) is optimal if r > 1 − (1 − w)T,










Due to T < 1, the right hand side exceeds T: q.e.d.
If the competence exceeds the tolerance limit, the decision-maker ﬁnds it optimal not
to disregard the signals nature sends. He then takes into account the internal message
created by his evaluation when choosing the action to be carried out (which is either c
or d). If, on the other hand, his competence does not exceed the tolerance limit, we call
this a competence-diﬃculty-gap or C-D-gap24. In this case, the decision problem is too
complex for the ability of the decision-maker to analyze it. His optimal behavior is to
choose one of the non-contingent reaction strategies.
Proposition 2.3: An imperfect decision-maker of zero detection skill will
never choose a contingent reaction strategy. The non-contingent strategy (cd)
will only be employed by decision-makers of negative detection skill.
Proof: Both of the statements can easily be seen in ﬁgure 3. Zero detection
skill means r/w = 1, hence the r−w−combination is on the main diagonale
in the unit box. In case of T > 1, (cc) is optimal, in case of T < 1, (dd)
is optimal. With T = 1, the decision-maker is indiﬀerent between (dd) and
(cc). (cd) is only optimal if r < w: q.e.d.
The reaction strategy (cd) means to act just contrary to the internal message. If a
decision-maker of negative detection skill chooses (cd), this simply corrects his erroneous
interpretation of signals. Thus we can disregard the strategy (cd) and limit our view to
decision-makers with non-negative detection skill.
Choosing a non-contingent reaction strategy leads to ”rule-governed behavior”: The
decision-maker systematically disregards information provided by nature and limits his
behavioral program to only one of the two available options, excluding the other one
from it25. Hence, this model explains why agents who try to decide rationally (but are
only limitedly able to do so) sometimes choose to follow rules instead of evaluating their
24Heiner (1983).
25Heiner points out that Simon has shown in his work on bounded rationality how decision-makers
systematically exclude information, i.e. available options, from their consideration to solve complex
decision problems; see Heiner (1983, 564) with some references.
11environment. This notion allows to describe imperfect decision-making as if it it were
taking place in two steps26:
• The constitutional choice: In the ﬁrst step, the decision-maker chooses a reac-
tion strategy. The decision for a non-contingent reactions strategy leads to rule-
governed behavior.
• The post-constitutional choice: In the second step, given the internal choice,
having received a signal and interpreted it, he carries out an option according to
the chosen reaction strategy.
If it is optimal for a decision-maker to choose one of the non-contingent reaction strate-
gies, then his behavior is predictable with certainty. To express this in terms of prob-
ability, having chosen (dd) means that the probability of carrying out action d is one,
whereas the choice of (cc) leads to a zero probability of carrying out d. On the other
hand, if a decision-maker chooses the contingent strategy (dc), then his actual behavior
depends on the parameters r,w, and π. Therefore, this theory only allows to derive a
probability distribution on which action will actually be carried out. Let h denote the
probability that a decision-maker of positive detection skill who has chosen the reaction
strategie (dc) carries out the action d, then
h = rπ + w(1 − π) = π(r − w) + w (5)
The option c will carried out with probability 1 − h. Obviously, h = π holds for a
perfect decision-maker, which means that he only carries out d if it is beneﬁcial to do
so. Modiﬁcations of the parameters π, l and g will have an inﬂuence on the tolerance
limit T as well as on h. However, marginal modiﬁcations are likely to have no inﬂuence
on the action being carried out. To give an example, if T > r/w holds in the ﬁrst place,
then even after a slight increase of g the decreased T might still be greater than r/w. In
this case, a decision-maker of positive detection skill would still choose (cc). Thus, even
though the parameter shift has made the option d more attractive, he keeps excluding
the option d and follows rule-governed behavior. As long as r/w < T holds, an increase
in T would have no inﬂuence on the imperfect decision-makers .
On the other hand, a small change in the paramters might induce the decision-maker to
switch from a non-contingent reaction strategy to a contingent one, which would cause a
dramatic change in his observable behavior. This non-marginality explains why changes
26The terminology is adapted from Buchanan, who points out ”... the necessity of distinguishing two
stages of social interaction, one which involves the selection of rules and one which involves action
within these rules.” (1975, X). Our model applies this concept to individual decision-making, which
can be analyzed as a game between an agent on the constitutional stage against the same agent
on the post-constitutional stage. In his later work, Buchanan describes a similar idea, yet rather
vaguely: ”Somehow and for some reason, the individual has chosen the set of prospects from which
future choices are to be made.” (1994, 125). Compare this concept to Selten (1990, 652), who
mentions a predecision that is supposed to activate the levels of decision-making, as described by
his three level theory in Selten (1978).
12in parameters do not always have the eﬀect that is predicted by the rational choice
theory27.
3. Imperfect tax evasion
3.1 Complexity and rule-governed behavior
Most economic models describe tax systems by a simple taxation function. In reality,
however, taxation is based on a very complex system of laws, comments, and judicature28.
Facing such a complex environment, tax payers are likely to commit errors when making
their decision whether to follow the law or to deviate from it. To deviate might be
benﬁcial, but it also might turn out to be harmful. If a C-D-gap occurs, rule-governed
behavior can be the optimal choice for an imperfect decision-maker who attempts to act
rationally, even though he has only limited ability to evaluate his environment.
In this chapter, we extend this basic theory that was outlined in the previous section.
Consider a tax payer who is used to evade taxes by a certain rate of her income. Let
us now assume that the income of this tax payer is increased. She then has to decide
whether to report at least a part of this increase, if she wants to stick to the evasion rate
she is used to, or not to report it, which would lead to an increased evasion rate.
3.2 The model
Our theory of imperfect tax evasion explains the observable tax payers’ behavior as an
imperfect decision between tax evasion rates. With α, we denote the evasion rate the
tax payer is used to (the starting point), whereas β is an upward deviation from this
rate. We will show that the higher this starting point, the more likely is a C-D-gap to
occur. For tax payers with limited competence, we derive three areas of evasion rates:
• In the lowest area, the tax payer would always increase his evasion rate.
• In the intermediate area, the tax payer would decide to let this decision depend
on the signal he receives, and which he is able to interpret only imperfectly.
• In the highest area, the tax payer will never increase his evasion rate.
According to the rational choice model of tax evasion, there exists a unique optimal tax
evasion rate, denoted as α∗, if the expected net income function X(α) (i.e. the sum of
27See Schmidtchen (1994).
28The German Income Tax Law alone consists of more than 140 Paragraphs that easily ﬁll more than
200 pages, left aside the administrative instructions on this law a careful tax-payer also should keep
in mind.
13non-taxed income, taxed income, and expected punishment) is continuous and concave
in the evasion rate29.
It would be optimal for her to choose the optimal evasion rate α∗. However, the legal
rules that govern the tax system are complex. Kaplow (1994) points out that a certain
degree of complexity cannot be avoided, if ability to pay is supposed to be the base of
taxation30.
The allowed deductions from the total income, the probability of detection, or the
marginal punishment might be unknown or not precisely determinable31. In tax systems
with progressive tax rates, even the marginal tax rate is diﬃcult to derive: ”Taxpay-
ers are only partially informed about their own objective circumstances, including the
requirements and costs of compliance and the risks and rewards of noncompliance.”32
Complexity hence may prove to be an obstacle for the tax-payer when trying to exactly
compute her optimal tax evasion rate α∗. Therefore, we assume that a decision-maker
sees the true (but unknown to her) α∗ as a random variable with a distribution function
Fα∗(α) := prob{α
∗ ≤ α} (6)
which is non-decreasing in α ∈ [0,1], with Fα∗(0) = 0 and Fα∗(1) = 1.
Let us denote the tax payer’s starting point as α ∈ [0,1], which is the evasion rate that
was chosen in the former period33. Not to report a small increase in her income would
lead to an evasion rate β which exceeds α. In this highly simpliﬁed and stylized situation,
the option set of the tax payer is {α;β}.
To carry out the option β instead of α might lead to an increased expected income or
to a loss, depending on whether the starting point α is below the optimum α∗ or not34.
We denote the eﬀect of an increased evasion rate as
29Consider e.g. an expected income function such as
X(α) = (1 − q)[1 − t(1 − α)] + q[1 − t − P(α)]
where q is the probability of detection, if evasion takes place, t is the marginal tax rate, and
P(α) is the punishment, with Pα > 0 < Pαα. See Allingham/Sandmo (1972) on such an ap-
proach. Pommerehne/Weck-Hannemann (1992), Alm/McClelland/Schulz (1989, 7), Ru-
binstein/Frey (1995, 1) and Graetz/Wilde (1985) did analyze the inﬂuence of risk-aversion on
the tax-payer’s decision.
30See also Moser (1994). Slemrod (1989, 157) distinguishes four aspects of complexity: the pre-
dictability of the tax law, its enforceability, the costs of compliance due to its diﬃculty, and its
manipulability, i.e. the tax payer’s possibilities to evade. In this paper we do not take into account
enforcement problems, since we focus on the three other aspects concerning the tax payer’s situation.
31See also Slemrod (1989, 179).
32Roth/Scholz/Witte (1989, 9).
33Another starting point to consider deviations from would be the tax payer’s observations of other
peoples’ behavior, see Alm/McClelland/Schulz (1989, 27). Sen (1994, 388) also proposes to
take into account the decision-maker’s tendency to imitate others: ”This type of reasoning ... points
to the need to bring in the inﬂuence of established norms of behavior in explaining what actions will
or will not be chosen.”
34Let us, for simplicity, assume that (β − α) is small enough to hold the following: α < α∗ ⇒ β < α∗.
14dX(α) := X(β) − X(α) =
￿
l(α) < 0 : α ≥ α∗
g(α) ≥ 0 : α < α∗ (7)
This deﬁnition allows to state the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1: Given a starting point α and an upward devitation β with
(β − α) → 0, then the ﬁrst derivative of dX(α) is negative.
Proof: lα,gα < 0 follows from the concavity of X(α): q.e.d.
Starting at α, the possible gain g > 0 from carrying out the devitaion β is decreasing
with an increase in the starting point α. The same holds true for the possible loss l < 0.
During the ﬁrst stage of the two-step decision process as outlined in section 2, the tax
payer decides whether to include the upward deviation into her behavioral program or
not. If the tax payer includes β into her behavioral program, she might repeat this
consideration for further deviations, yet starting from β. The tolerance limit for any
possible value of α∗ and any starting point α under consideration is the ratio of the





Let us deﬁne the absolute expected loss as L := −l(α)Fα∗(α) and the absolute expected
gain as G := g(α)[1−Fα∗(α)], then the tolerance limit can simply be written as T = L/G,
and L,G > 0,Lα ≥ 0 ≥ Gα holds. We assume that nature not only decides on the true
value of α∗ and therefore on whether a devitation α is harmful or beneﬁcial. Nature also
sends perfect signals, which however the tax-payer is only imperfectly able to transform
into an internal message. Let us denote the state α∗ > αi as SG and the corresponding
internal message as ˆ SG. For the state α∗ ≤ αi we deﬁne the signal SL and the internal
message ˆ SL respectively. Then we can deﬁne the tax-payer’s detection skill parameters
as
r := prob{ ˆ SG|SG} (9)
w := prob{ ˆ SG|SL} (10)
The parameters r and w are assumed as exogenously ﬁxed. According to the proposition
2.1, a tax payer prefers the deviation β over the starting point α if, and only if
• r
w > T(α) holds and she observes ˆ SG
• 1 − r
1 − w > T(α) holds and she observes ˆ SL
15The ﬁrst derivative of the tolerance limit T has an important property, as statetd in the
following proposition35:
Proposition 3.2: The ﬁrst derivative of the tolerance limit is non-negative.
Proof: From T = L/G follows Tα =
LαG−LGα
G2 , with Gα ≤ 0 ≤ Lα and
L,G > 0. Hence, Tα ≥ 0 follows directly: q.e.d.
3.3 Optimal reaction strategies
In this model, reaction strategies are pairs of actions where the ﬁrst entry denotes the
reaction on the message ˆ SG and the second stands for the reaction on ˆ SL. E.g., choosing
the non-contingent reaction strategy (αα) means never to deviate from α, regardless
of the internal message. The tax payer chooses rule-governed behavior. On the other
hand, the contingent strategy (βα) describes the tax payer’s attempt to evaluate her
interpretation of nature’s signal. The following ﬁgure 4 makes use of the propositions
2.1 and 3.2. It visualizes the relation between the tolerance limit (which is increasing in
α), the optimal reaction strategies, and the parameters r and w for the case of a tax
payer with positive, but imperfect detection skill (1 > r > w > 0).











If the tolerance limit is very small, namely if T < (1 − r)/(1 − w) holds, then the tax
payer will always increase his evasion rate. If T is higher than r/w, then a competence-
diﬃculty gap occurs: The limited ability to evaluate the environment is not suﬃcient
anymore to cope with the complexity of the situation. Let us, for given values of r and
w, deﬁne
35In this basic model, we don’t need to derive the second derivative of T.
16• an upper threshold value αh := T −1(
r
w)
• and a lower threshold value as αh := T −1( 1−r
1−w).
An imperfect decision-making tax payer will never increase her evasion rate above the
upper threshold value αh
36. If the tax payer starts her considerations from a point α
that is deﬁnitely lower than α∗, then she will never carry out the optimal evasion rate,
because for an imperfect decision-maker holds αh < α∗. The reason ist straightforward:
Approaching α∗, G shrinks to zero, hence T grows toward inﬁnity. Therefore, a decision-
maker of ﬁnite r/w faces αh as a stop value before having reached α∗.
Thus the model provides an explanation for the tax payer puzzle: If an external observer
knows the actual value of α∗ and the parameter settings are such that αh < α∗, then
the model predicts that an imperfect decision-making tax payer will choose less than the
optimal evasion rate.
In the intermediate case, where r/w > T > (1−r)/(1−w) holds, the tax payer chooses
her contingent reaction strategy (βα). Observing the internal message ˆ SG induces her
to increase her evasion rate, whereas ˆ SL leads her to stick with the lower rate. In this
case, the model only allows for a stochastic prediction of the tax payer’s observable
behavior, since the probability of the action that actually gets carried out depends on
the parameters r and w and the distribution Fα∗(α).
The model also provides an explanation for the empirical observations that tax payers’
observable behavior does not respond to changes in the tax policy paramters t,q and Pα
the way the rational choice model predicts. E. g., to decrease the expected punishment
qPα might have no inﬂuence on the observable behavior. Of course, a lower expected
punishment increases α∗ would decrease the value of the probability distribution Fα∗(α)
for each α < 1, leading to a higher probability that an upward deviation is beneﬁcial.
This would decrease the tolerance limit T(α), which causes a higher αh. However, this
parameter change might not have any eﬀect on an imperfect tax payer’s behavior. Only
the choice of some marginal tax payers might be inﬂuenced by an increase in αh, given
that this increase makes the contingent reaction strategy optimal just for them37.
Our model of imperfect tax evasion therefore provides an explanation for the empirical
observation that parameter shifts have no (or only a small) impact on tax payers’ be-
havior. Due to the stochastical predictions, an empirical test of this model would require
to solve some diﬃculties38. However, at least our main result deﬁnitely is a falsiﬁable
prediction: An imperfect decision-making tax payer will never carry out an evasion rate
above αh.
36Recall that for a perfect decision-maker, r/w is inﬁnite, hence this stop value will necessarily be
greater than any α∗.
37With respect to changes of the paramter t, it can be argued in the similar way.
38Slemrod (1989, 178) describes the need to ﬁnd valid proxies for complexity as the main obstacle.
174. Conclusion
An explanation for the tax payer puzzle - people pay more taxes than the rational choice
theory predicts - should not simply state that the suboptimal tax evasion rate is due to
morality. People have the option to deviate from moral rules as well as from tax laws.
But their computational limits (competence) and the complexity of the decision problem
(diﬃculty) can keep them from reaching the optimal solution. Taking this into account,
the model of imperfect decision-making explains the puzzle for tax payers who decide
whether to deviate from a low evasion rate.
The lower the rate a tax payer starts to consider deviating from, the more likely a
deviation is attractive to him. However, as the considered tax evasion rate increases, the
occurence of a competence-diﬃculty-gap that motivates the imperfect decision-maker
not to consider further deviations becomes more likely. This gap can stop an imperfect
decision-making tax payer before he reaches the optimal evasion rate as derived by
perfect choice models.
One might consider some objections against crucial assumptions of our model, e.g. our
neglection of learning eﬀects: If the tax payer repeatedly decides on his evasion rate, this
might increase his competence. Hence the values of r and w should be endogenized in a
multi-period model. Another sensible modiﬁcation of the model would be to introduce a
probability of detection q that increases with the deviation rate. The latter would lead
to a faster growing tolerance limit T.
Imperfect tax evasion as outlined here is only a basic model. Some further modiﬁca-
tions should be taken into account when following the signal-detection theory on which
Heiner has based his theory of imperfect decision-making. According to this theory,
the values of r and w are not independent of the potential losses or gains that might
be caused by a deviation, as we assumed here. Hence the predicted stop value for the
consideration of deviations, αh, would be diﬀerent from the one we showed in our model.
However, we are convinced that modiﬁcations like these could easily be taken into ac-
count and would not lead to qualitatively diﬀerent results.
The complexity of tax laws is not just a matter of justice, which might require detailed
tax laws, but also has an impact on tax compliance. The more complex the tax system,
the more likely a C-D-gap that keeps a tax payer from increasing her evasion. Of course,
this proposition only holds true if tax authorities and courts have suﬃcient detection
skill39. Since the creation of detection skill is at least in part a matter of experience, it
would not be surprising if the specialists in the authorities had an advantage compared
to single tax payers.
39Krause (1996) discusses the interaction of imperfect tax payers with an imperfect tax authority. See
also Slemrod (1989, 176).
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